Poland’s second presidential veto of a bill tied to the Digital Services Act has blocked a proposed national route for restricting access to specified unlawful online content. But a separate law establishing Poland’s digital-services supervisory framework has already taken effect. The distinction matters: the EU regulation remains in force, while one additional enforcement procedure has not.

A second veto, and a narrower question than the headlines suggest

Polish President Karol Nawrocki vetoed a second bill linked to Poland’s implementation of the European Union’s Digital Services Act on November 13. It would have created a national procedure for orders restricting access to specified unlawful online material. The president’s office identified it as the October 22 act amending the law on electronic services and other statutes, parliamentary print 2693.

The decision was the second veto of legislation in this policy area this year: Nawrocki rejected an earlier, broader implementation bill in January. His November statement said he had vetoed 48 government bills during his presidency. The latest decision concerns one Polish measure, not the EU regulation itself, which remains directly applicable.

After the January veto, the government split its approach into two bills. The first established Poland’s supervisory framework for digital services and was signed in September. The second, adding a procedure for orders against specified illegal content, completed its parliamentary stage in October and was sent to the president on October 23. Only that measure was rejected in November.

Sources: Prezydent podpisał sześć ustaw, jedną zawetował · Polish President Nawrocki vetoes digital content bill for second time · Prezydent zawetował ustawę dot. blokowania nielegalnych treści w internecie · Wniosek Prezydenta RP ws. nowelizacji ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną — uzasadnienie odmowy podpisania · Ustawa z dnia 22 października 2026 r. o zmianie ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną oraz niektórych innych ustaw — final text after Senate amendments

What the rejected legislation was intended to do

The bill would have allowed specified authorities to order providers to restrict access to online material linked to a defined list of offences. The government highlighted threats, incitement to violence, child sexual exploitation and other serious crimes. This was not a general power to prohibit unpopular opinions or a free-standing hate-speech ban.

The final text did not place every case before a judge in advance. The president’s written justification says prior court decisions were reserved for content associated with Articles 256 and 257 of Poland’s Criminal Code. In most other cases, UKE or KRRiT would issue an administrative order, subject to later judicial review. The same procedure also allowed a user to seek restoration where a platform had excessively or mistakenly restricted lawful content.

The final version made immediate execution available for specified child-sexual-exploitation offences and, following a police or prosecutor request, offences under Criminal Code Articles 119(1), 148a(1), 151 or 156a. The Article 119(1) route was added by a Senate amendment. Normally, the author had two days to respond and the intermediary up to 14 days to provide evidence; for urgent cases, both periods fell to 24 hours. A party could object to an administrative order in court within 14 days, and the authority had two days to forward it. In the separate Articles 256/257 court-first route, the court had 14 days to decide.

Sources: Bezpieczniejszy internet zablokowany. Prezydent zawetował ustawę o DSA · Wniosek Prezydenta RP ws. nowelizacji ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną — uzasadnienie odmowy podpisania · Ustawa z dnia 22 października 2026 r. o zmianie ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną oraz niektórych innych ustaw — final text after Senate amendments

What is already in force in Poland

A separate law dated September 4, 2026, was published in Poland’s Journal of Laws on October 6 as item 1296. The official legal register records it as in force from November 6. It is the first of the two measures prepared after the January veto and remains unaffected by the president’s November decision.

That law designates the president of the Office of Electronic Communications, or UKE, as Poland’s Digital Services Coordinator. It also assigns defined responsibilities to the competition authority and broadcasting regulator. UKE says its role includes supervising providers’ DSA obligations, handling relevant complaints and cooperating with the European Commission and other national coordinators.

The EU Digital Services Act has applied across the bloc since February 17, 2024. It establishes duties for intermediary services and platforms, including explanations and complaint routes when platforms restrict users’ content or accounts. Those user-facing rights and the national coordinator’s oversight role are not the same mechanism as the separate content-access orders that the president vetoed.

Sources: Ustawa z dnia 4 września 2026 r. o zmianie ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną oraz niektórych innych ustaw · Od fal radiowych do cyfrowego bezpieczeństwa. Rola Prezesa UKE jako Koordynatora ds. usług cyfrowych

The president's argument: judicial control before restriction

Nawrocki argues that decisions about whether online expression amounts to a crime should not be left primarily to administrative officials. His written justification focuses on prior judicial authorisation versus later review, particularly where an order could be enforced immediately. He argues that even a short restriction can affect public debate, even if later overturned. Article 11n also allowed a domain to enter a registry only if no effective measure could secure compliance and at least one further condition applied: the site mainly distributed illegal material, URL-level blocking was technically impossible or obviously ineffective, or the provider ignored an additional notice. DNS blocking would follow within 48 hours; this was not automatic for every order.

The Supreme Court’s July opinion on an earlier version raised concerns about proportionality, judicial review and procedural safeguards. Panoptykon, a digital-rights group writing on October 13 before the final Senate amendments, offered a different emphasis: it argued the orders targeted a limited list of offences and that platforms, not UKE directly, would carry out restrictions.

Those analyses do not settle the final text’s constitutionality. The Supreme Court opinion predates the final October changes; Panoptykon’s article predates the Senate amendment bringing Article 119(1) into the immediate-execution route. The question is whether the different procedures and safeguards were proportionate to each category of case.

Sources: Wniosek Prezydenta RP ws. nowelizacji ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną — uzasadnienie odmowy podpisania · Póki algorytmy będą się karmić emocjami, przemoc będzie wiralem · Do druku nr 2693 — opinia Sądu Najwyższego (2693-003.pdf)

The government's argument: a gap in rapid response

Digital Affairs Minister Krzysztof Gawkowski says the veto blocks a faster response to serious online offences, including threats, violence and material endangering children. The ministry argues the bill would have given authorities a defined route to act when platforms did not respond quickly enough, while preserving ways to challenge orders in court.

Gawkowski’s promise to prepare another bill is not yet a legislative proposal. Any replacement would need to be assessed against the vetoed text, including urgent cases, the roles of UKE and KRRiT, the author’s opportunity to respond, and the timing and effectiveness of judicial review. Its content cannot be assumed in advance.

The president points to existing tools for restricting terrorist content under the EU’s Terrorist Content Online Regulation (EU) 2021/784. Their existence does not show that all current restrictions require a court order or that those tools cover the same offences. The dispute is about the proposed mechanism’s reach, speed and judicial oversight.

Sources: Prezydent podpisał sześć ustaw, jedną zawetował · Bezpieczniejszy internet zablokowany. Prezydent zawetował ustawę o DSA · Polish President Nawrocki vetoes digital content bill for second time · Wniosek Prezydenta RP ws. nowelizacji ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną — uzasadnienie odmowy podpisania

What happens next—and what remains unknown

The immediate result is that the October 22 act will not become law in the form sent to the president. The September law establishing the DSA coordination framework remains in force. Nawrocki sent the Sejm a reasoned request to reconsider the bill on November 13; as of November 14, no Sejm vote on the veto or published replacement text had been identified.

Three questions remain open: whether the government will narrow or redesign the immediate-execution route; whether UKE’s new coordinator role will make DSA complaint handling more accessible in practice; and whether a revised procedure can address serious unlawful content without disproportionate restrictions on expression. This dispute is separate from Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal conflict. The two controversies have different legal records and should not be merged.

Sources: Prezydent podpisał sześć ustaw, jedną zawetował · Bezpieczniejszy internet zablokowany. Prezydent zawetował ustawę o DSA · Polish President Nawrocki vetoes digital content bill for second time · Wniosek Prezydenta RP ws. nowelizacji ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną — uzasadnienie odmowy podpisania · Ustawa z dnia 22 października 2026 r. o zmianie ustawy o świadczeniu usług drogą elektroniczną oraz niektórych innych ustaw — final text after Senate amendments